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SITUATION II. 
A United States auxiliary collier commanded by an 
officer appointed by the Secretary of theN avy is in a har-
bor of State X. The collier collides with and injures a 
foreign vessel. The owner of the foreign vessel brings 
suit against the commander of the collier for damages 
under the civil law, claiming that the status of the collier 
is uncertain, and that the commander \vould in any case 
be liable as would the co1nmander of a ship of StateX, 
the commanders of whose vessels, public and private, are 
liable in the civil courts of that state under simila1· cir-
cumstances. 
'Vhat position should the senior officer of the l7nited 
States take? 
SOLUTION. 
The senior officer. acting in a<;cordance with principle, 
precedent, and regulations, should appoint a board of in-
quiry and maintain that the suit should not be brought 
against the 1naster of the auxiliary collier, but that the 
elai1ns should be referred to the United States Govern-
ment through eli ploma tic channels. 
~OTES 0~ SITC~-\TIO~ II. 
Gene1·al.-In this situation the o'Yner of the injured 
foreign Yessel clain1s that the status of a United States 
auxiliary collier is uncertain. He also clain1s that e,~en 
if the collier 'Yas recognized as a public Yessel it 'Youlcl be 
liable·to the s~une treatment as do1nestic public Yessels un-
der si1nilar circun1stances and that the collier could there-
fore be made the defendant in r·em or its conunancler the 
defendant in persono1n in a :-:nit for da1nage.s resulting 
from a collision. 
Claims against public Yessels and property in foreign 
ports ha Ye been n1ade in Yarion~ fonu~. 'rhese clai1ns 
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haYe involved property rights, salv·age and other serYice~ 
collisions. and in general such 1natters as could properly 
be subject to national ·court jurisdict~on. 
Prope1'ty right8 against a foreign war vessel.-In 1812 
Chief Justice )lar~ha ll delivered the opinion in the cele-
brated case of the Schooner Exchange v. l\f'Fa<ldon. 
T'his case inYolYecl the Ycry delicate and important in-
quiry. \Yhether an ~\tnrrican citizPn can assert, in an 
~\n1erican court. property rights against a foreign na-
tional Yes~el. The learned Chief .Jnstice laid down the 
fundntnental prinri pie-
The jurisdiction of the courts is a branch of that possessed by 
the nation as an independent soYereign vower. 
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is nec-
essarily exclusiYe and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation 
not imposed by itself. Any restrictions upon it, deriYing Yalidity 
from an external source. ''"ould imply a dimiuntion of its soYer-
eignt~- to the extent of the restriction, and an inYestment of that 
soYC>rei~nty to the ~amP exte~1t in tlwt uqwer which could impose 
such re~triction. 
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and con1plete po"·er of a 
na tiou within its O\Yll territories mnst he traced up to the consent 
of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate 
source. 
The consent may be either express vr implied. In the latter 
case it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of 
construction, but, if understood, not less obligatory. 
The world being composed of distinct soYereignties, possessing 
equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is pro-
moted by intercourse with each other, and by an intrecharige of 
those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, 
nll soYereigns lla Ye consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases 
under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and com-
plete jurisdiction within their respect h·~ territories which soY-
ereignty confers. 
After a full discussion o£ \Tarious fonns o£ imtnunity, 
the decision continues: 
It seems, then, to the court to be a principle of public law, that 
national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power open 
for their reception, are to be considered as exem11ted by the con-
sent of that 11ower from its juri~diction., 
Without doubt the so,·ereign of the place is capable of destroy-
ing this implication. He may claim and exercise jurisdiction 
either by employing force or by subjecting such Yessels to the or-
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dinary tribunals. But until such power be exerted in a manner 
not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as 
having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction which 
it would be a breach of faith to exercise. Those general statutory 
provisions, therefore, which are descriptive of the ordinary juris-
diction of the judicial tribunals, wllich give an individual, who~e 
property has been wrested from him, a right to claim that property 
in the courts of the country in which it is found, ought not, in the 
opinion of this court, to be so construed as to give them jurisdic-
tion in a case in which the sovereign power has impliedly con-
sented to waive its jurisdiction . 
The arguments in favor of this opinion which have been drawn 
from the general inability of the judicial power to enforce its de-
cisions in cases of this description, from the consideration that the 
sovereign power of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs 
committed by a sovereign, that the questions to which such wrongs 
give birth are rather questions of poljcy than of law, that they are 
for diplomatic rather than legal discussion, are of great weight, 
and merit serious attention. ( 7 Cranch, "C. S. Supreme Court Re-
ports, 116.) 
Salcage and foreign waT i)essels.-Sir \~Villiam Scott. 
in 1820~ in a suit £or salvage against the Prins Frede1·ilc, 
said: -
I think that the first applica tion for a recon1peuse in the nature 
of sa 1 ntge, ougllt, in the case of n sllip of \var helongiv;; to a for· 
eign state, to have been made to the re})resentative of that state 
resident in tllis c-ountry. In the present case no doubt can be enter-
tained that just atte11tion would have been paid to the application, 
and clue care taken, after proper information obtained, to have 
answered the claim in son1e form or other, as substantial justice 
might ~een1 to re(}nire; for i t is uot reasonable to suppose that 
prinite indiYidrals iu tllis coun try should go unrewarded for 
SE-rYices rendereu to ships of foreign governments when they 
\vould have been liberally rewarded for similar services performed 
for such ships belonging to their O\YB. (2 Dodson's Admiralty 
Reports, 451, 484.) 
In the case of the United States frigate Constitution, 
carrying 1nachinery, etc., £rom the Paris Exposition, 
stranded on Ballard Point, England, in 1879, and against 
·which suit was brought for salvage by owner of steam 
tug which pulled Constitution off, Sir Robert Phillimore 
said: 
There is no doubt as to the general proposition that ships of 
war belongirig to a nation with whom this country is at peace 
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are exempt fron1 the civil jurisdiction of this country. I have 
listened in vain for any peculiar circumstances to take this case 
out of that general provosition. It has happened to me more than 
once, since I have had the honour of sitting in this chair, to have 
been requested by foreign states to sit as arbitrator and to make 
an a ward in cases-one of collision and two of salvage. If a 
similar request had been made to the court in this case, I would 
gladly have undertaken the duty sought to be imposed upon it; 
but I have now only to consider whether there is an~· authority 
for the proposition that when a foreign state refuses to waive the 
privilege which it posses~es it is competent to this court, neverthe-
less, to treat it as an individual and serve civil process on its 
vroperty. I ani clearly of the opinion that it would be very 
wrong and inl}H'oper in n1e to assent to this application on the 
part of the owner of the steam tug. ( 4 Law Reports. Probate 
Division, 39.) 
This decision denies the right of a British citizen to 
con1pel payment by a public vessel for services rendered 
when the vessel "·as in great need. 
Lllilitary supplies belonging to a foJ·eign sovc7'fign.-
In the ca~e of \T a vasseur 1'. l(rupp the question of juris-
diction over the property of a foreign soYereign was 
raised. The foreign soYereign involved 'vas the E1nperor 
of Japan. The case "·as brought in England and is suin-
marized as follo"·s : 
A foreign sovereign bought in Gennany shells made there, but 
said to be infringements of an English patent. r_rhey were brought 
to this country in order to be put on board a ship of war belong-
ing to the foreign sovereign, and the l)atentee obtained an injunc-
tion against the agents of the foreign sovereign and the persons 
in whose custody the shells were, restraining then1 from remodng 
the shells. The foreign sovereign then applied to be and was made 
a defendant to the suit. An order was then made up by the mas-
ter of the rolls, and approved on appeal, that notwithstanding the 
injunction he should be at liberty to remove the shells. 
In 1877 the British court gave the opinion that prop-
erty of a foreign sovereign in Great Britain could not. be 
held, saying of the Chancery Division of the High Court 
of Justice-
This court has no jurisdiction, and, in my opinion, none of the 
courts in this country have any jurisdiction, to interfere with the 
JU'Opert~· of a foreign sovereign, nwre (•specia1ly with what we call 
the public vroperty of the state of which he is soverign as distin-
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guished from tba t which n1ay be his own private property. The 
courts ha Ye no jurisdiction to do so, not only because there is no 
jurisdiction as against the individual, but because there is no 
jurisdiction as against the foreign country whose property they 
are, although that foreign country is represented, as all foreign 
countries haYing a soYereign are represented, by the individual 
who is the soYereign. (Law Reports, 9 Chancery Division, 351.) 
Domestic regulations as to foreign war vessels in time 
of peace.-The attempt to regulate in some detail the en-
trance and sojourn of foreign public vessels has been 
made by several states. States having large navies have 
not generally made many reg~lations. Public vessels are 
required to respect police, quarantine, sanitary, fiscal, and 
harbor regulations. 
Article 11 of the Nether lands royal decree of February 
2, 1893, provided-
that foreign ships and vessels of war shall respect the existing 
pclice, sanitary, and fiscal laws and regulations, and shall further 
submit to all rules and regulations of the port, in both cases to the 
same extent a~ is de111anded of the na tiona] ships and vessels of 
war. (~ )Joore, International Law Digest, 593.) 
Regulations so1newhat siinilar in scope are in force in 
other states. 
In the second volu1ne of Professor Moore's monumental 
and most valuable work, "A Digest of International 
Law·~" there appears a letter from the Secretary of State 
to the Secretary of the Navy in regard to the attitude of 
the United States to\vard such regulations as above men-
tioned: 
I haYe the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter from 
your Department, dated the 9th of August last, inclosing for an 
expression of this Department's views in the matter a copy of a 
letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation of the Navy 
Department, with inclosures, relatiYe to the propriety and feasi-
bility of issuing an order to naval vessels directing that when 
pilots are not employed local foreign Jaws requiring the employ-
ment of pilots are not to be held to compel the payment of pilot-
age by public vessels. 
In reply I have the honor to say that the laws of some of our 
States require the payment of pilotage fees when pilots are not 
employed, and these Jaws, by their terms, apply· to an vessels. 
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The doctrine of international law is that all -vessels are subject 
to the re-venue and police regulations, including those in regard to 
pilotage. of the territorial waters 'Yhich such Yessels may enter. 
In the statement of the doctrine no exception is made in favor of 
public Yessels. 
In ~ecretary Chandler's letter of July 12, 1884, inclosed in yours, 
the statement is made that certain exemptions are allowed by 
international law to public vessels; and in Secretary Freling-
huysens letter, also inclosed with yours, the same statement is 
made. Xo authorities are cited in support of the proposition, 
while the doctrine abo-ve mentioned is stated in Lawrence, Inter-
national La·w, pages 223 and 22G; Hall, International Law, page 
192: rradier-Fodere, International Law, section 237!>. 
The latter says that "the ports, the roadsteads, the harbors 
form a dependency of the national public domain, and the ships 
of foreign nations are under the obligation to obser-ve rigorously 
the general and special regulations in force in the harbors, road-
steads, and ports." 
In Yiew of the foregoing the Department could not adYise the 
adoption of the rule suggested. (Page 583.) 
Regulations in regard to the sojourn in tirr1e of peace o:f 
war vessels of a foreign power within the territorial wa-
ters of a given state n1ay be and have been 1nade. The 
regulations most frequently have regard to police and 
quarantine . 
. A. royal decree of February 18. 1901~ regulates in con-
siderable detail the ad1nission of foreign 1nen-of-war to 
the harbors of Belgi un1. 
Leopold II, King of the Belgians, to all present and to come, 
greetings: 
Considering that the time is opportune to regulate, in conform-
ity with international law and the obligations of perpetual neu-
trality, the admission of foreign men-of-war in the waters and 
harbors of Belgium; 
On the proposition of our ~Iinisters of Foreign Affairs, of War, 
and of Railways, Posts, and Telegraphs, 
"r e ha Ye ordered and order : 
GE~ERAL DISPOSITIOXS IN TI~IE OF PEACE. 
ARTICLE I. In time of peace war Yessels belonging to foreign 
powers may enter freely Belgian harbors of the ~orth Sea and 
anchor off said waters within territorial waters. provided that 
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the number of such yessels flying the same flag, including those 
already within that zone or in harbor, does not exceed three. 
ARTICLE II. :F'oreign n1en-of-war may not enter the Belgian 
waters of the Scheidt, anchor in the roads of Antwerp, nor pene-
tr·ate within the inland waters of the Kingdom without first ob-
tailling the authorization of the minister of foreign affairs. 
This authorization shall be asked through the medium of the 
snbinspector of Belgian pilotage at Flushing. 
ARTICLE III. Foreign men-of-wa:r;,. unless especially authorized 
by the GoYernment, may not remain longer than two weeks in the 
Belgian territorial waters and harbors. 
They are required to put to sea within six hours when requested 
to do so by the navy administration or the territorial military 
n uthorities, even should the time fixed for their stay not have 
expired. 
ARTICLE IV. Should peculiar circun1stanees demand it, the Gov-
ernment reserYes· the right to modify the aboYe restrictions to the 
entrance or stay of foreign men-of-war in Belgian waters and 
harbors. 
ARTICLE V. The dispositions of Articles I, II, and III do not 
apply to men-of-war whose admission has been authorized through 
diplomatic channels, nor to Yessels on board of which happen to 
be either a chief of state, a prince of a reigning dynasty, or a 
diplomatic agent accredited near the King or GoYernment. 
ARTICLE VI. Foreign men-of-war in Belgian waters are prohib-
ited from making sketches or taking soundings, as well as from 
engaging in landing or firing exercises. 
:Members of the crew should be without arms when on shore. 
Commissioned and noncommissioned officers may carry the arms 
which form a part of their un~forms. 
Boats plying in the harbors and territorial waters must not be 
armed. 
Should funeral honors be giYen on shore, an exemption to para-
graph 2 of the present article may be authorized by the minister 
of war on request of the territorial military authorities. 
ARTICLE VII. Captains of foreign men-of-war at·e required to 
observe the laws and regulations concerning the police, public 
health, taxes, and imposts, unless exceptions be established by 
particular conYention or by international usages. 
Status of public vessels other than war vessels.-From 
the decisions and regulations it would seem to be estab-
lished that a public vessel o:f war would not be liable to 
the jurisdiction o:f a local court. 
There are, however, many vessels engaged in such serv-
ice as may giYe rise to questions in regard to exen1ption. 
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These Yessels may be engaged in transport, 1nail, tele-
graph, collier, or other service for the govenunent of a 
state and under state control. 
Opinions upon the status of such vessels have gradually 
becon1e 1nore clearly defined. 
Status of a troopship.-In March, 1842, the Athol, a 
British troopship, ran do\vn and sunk the British Ship-
ping Co1npany's brig Jane OZark. Application was made 
to recover for the loss. 
Doctor Lushington gives his opinion in the case: 
X ow the first consideration which occurs is this, viz: How far .. 
could I enforce the execution of the process if it should be granted 
and resisted? 'l'his is an important point to be considered, in the 
first instance, in all cases of this kind, inasn1uch as it would, I 
conceiYe, be a Yer;r imprudent and scarcely a befitting attempt in 
any conrt to issue a process which it could not enforce, and which, 
if resisted, must terminate in a defeat of the authority of the 
cc·urt. In applying this consideration to the present case the fol-
lowing difficulties suggest themseh·es as conclusiYe of the question 
which I am now called upon to determine: In the first place, I 
feel tba t I could not enforce the monition if the lords of the Ad-
miralty should refuse to appear; and secondly, assuming that an 
appearance should be giYen on their behalf, and it should be found 
that the damage in question was occasioned by the fault of th·~ 
troopship, the Athol, or those on board her, I could not enforce 
the payment of that damage as against the lords of the Admiralty 
under the circumstances of this case. But there are also other 
considerations which induce me to refuse this application. As far 
af, my OY\rn experience extends in the practice of this court, I am 
Eot aware of any case in which a similar process has been issued; 
on the contrary, in a case which was deci9-ed by Lord Stowell, 
and which is the only case that I can recollect in any degree ap-
proaching to the circumstances of this case, Lord Stowell ex-
pressly refused to issue any monition upon the ground that "he 
was satisfied that the lords commissioners of the Admiralty would 
be disposed to do justice upon being convinced that wrong had 
been done, and that the occurrence complained of had actually 
taken place." (1 Robinson's Admiralty Reports, 374.) 
Status of a public mail vessel.-The Parlement Belge, 
a vessel belonging to the l(ing of the Belgians, unanned 
and carrying mails, collided with a private British vessel, 
the Daring. In the Court of Appeal in 1880 it was held, 
reversing the decision of the Admiralty Division: 
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As a consequence of the absolute independence of every sover-
eign authority and of the international comity which induces every 
sovereign state to respect the independence of every other sover-
eign state, each and every one declines to exercise by means of 
any of its courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person 
of any sovereign or ambassador of any other state, or over the 
public property of any state which is destined to public use, or 
over the property of any ambassador, though such sovereign, am-
bassador, or property be within its territory, and therefore, but 
for the common agreement, subject to its jurisdiction. 
In the san1e case it 'vas also held-
that an unarmed packet belonging to the sovereign of a foreign 
state, and in the hands of officers commissioned by him, and em-
ployed in carrying mails, is not liable to be seized in a suit in rem 
to recover redress for a collision, and this immunity is not lost 
by reason of the packet's also carrying merchandise and passen-
gers for hire. (5 Law Reports, Probate Division, 197.) 
Liability for pilotage.-In the case of Symons v. Baker 
(I(. B. Div., Aug. 4, 1905), the J{harki, a coal vessel 
owned by His ~Iajesty's Govern1nent, was involved. The 
f{harki "\"Vas a "collier exclusively engaged in going back-
\rards and forwards to various ports, carrying coal for 
the navy." She flew· the Devonport Dockyard flag, but 
not the navy flag. She appears in the Navy List under 
the heading, "List of small steam vessels, tugs, etc., em-
ployed on harbor service." Her n1aster held a board of 
trade certificate issued by the dockyard authorities at 
Devonport and acted on instructions received from the 
coaling officer at Devonport Dockyard. "He is not an 
officer of. the royal navy. The cre'v of the vessel were 
engaged at the dockyard under articles of agreement." 
It 'vas claimed that the Inaster of such a vessel 'vas liable 
to pilotage dues and that the vessel was used for " com-
mercial purposes." · 
Lord Chief Justice Alverstone, in granting an appeal, 
said of the claim that the J{harki was used for" commer-
cial purposes." ' 
I thin]} there was nothing commercial about this. I think the 
facts show, and the learned magistrate does not differ from that, 
that the Kharki was being employed as what may be called a coal 
tender, and solely as a tender taking coal to the ships of the navy. 
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Therefore, unless some distinction can be drawn between one of 
His l\lajesty's ships performing a more dignified sen·ice and one 
which was verforming, as this Yessel was, a most useful but less 
dignified sen·ice, I do not understand the distinction of ''com-
mercial purposes.'' 
N o"J' the Yessel in question is clearly a I\:ing~s ship; that 
is to say, she co1nes within the words of section 741 of the 
-~Ierchant Shipping Act, which are, "shall not, except as 
expressly provided, apply to ships belonging to I-lis 
~fajesty." Of the clain1 that the master of the J{llar!Li 
would be liable because he ordered the pilotage~ it "~as 
said, "He [the master] is the rnaster of the J(ing-'s ship; 
he acts as n1aster in behalf of the Crown : he is an· agent 
in the ordinary sense of the word.'~ The rmnedy ·would 
be by petition of right for the amount of clain1. X either 
ship or 1naster could be proceeded against. (X, .t\.sp. 
l\far. La1r ~ Cas. 129.) 
ColUsion of public and prvl/v at( 't'usscls of dijj'£r£nt 
States.-In 1883 the }!exican gunboat lndependencia ran 
down the .... -\...n1erican schooner Dayligltt. .A dispatch fron1 
l\fr. I~.,relinghuysen, Secretary of State. to "Jlr. "Jiorgan, 
minister to ~fexico. show~ the nttitnde of the 1 ... nited 
States at that period: 
.JI r. Frelin g h uyfien U1 JjJ r .. M orpa n. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
lVashington, Noventber 15, 1883. 
SrR: Your dispatch, Xo. 690, of the 21st September, in relation 
to the claim of Capt. Fred. L. Blair~ of the American schooner 
Daylight, bas been received. 
The note of the 18th of September addressed to you by )Jr. Fer-
llandez, a covy of which accompanies your dispatch. bas been care-
fully considered. I regret to find that the inquiry made in my 
instruction of the 24th of ~larch last (No. 382) ~ and which it is 
perceived you submitted to l\1r. Fernandez, bas not. as I conceive, 
been explicitly answered by the :Mexican Government. If liability 
to the party injured attaches as a result of the lndependencia's 
action in running down the .American schooner, such liability is 
imputable, not to the commander of the gunboat, but to the ~Iexi­
can Government. If 1\Ir. Fernandez is to be understood .as saying 
that an American citizen may, in such a case, maintain legal pro-
ceedings for the recovery of the damages thus claimed directly 
against the Government of ~IexiC'(l in the court~ 0f that Hepublir. 
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I have only to observe that I have not heretofore understood that, 
under the laws of 1\fexico, the Government of that country might 
be sued in its own courts either by a citizen of the Republic or a 
foreigner, without special permission having first been ~iven for 
that purpose, and before I could consent to submit the claimant 
in the present case to the expense and delay of such a proceeding 
it is desirable that I should be exactly informed on that point. 
In l\Ir. 1\Iariscal's note to you of the 3d of ~larch last, that min-
ister, amongst other observations in regard to the claim, says, 
"If Captain Blair considered that the ~fexican Government is 
responsible for the disaster which his vessel suffered, he should 
apply directly to the department of war and marine, under whose 
jurisdiction the Independencia is. If that department admits the 
responsibility of the Government in the matter, all difficulties will 
at once disappear," and the same sentiment is reiterated by l\fr. 
Fernandez in his note to you of the 15th ultimo. With reference 
to these suggestions I have only to remark that the claim in ques-
tion is presented by the Government in behalf of its injured citi-
zen through the ordinary and only recognized channels of com-
munication between it and that of l\Iexico, and if by the laws or 
administrative regulations of that Republic it is made essential 
that the facts should be first investigated by the ministry of war 
and marine, it is conceived that the subject should be referred to 
that department by the minister of foreign affairs. Such would 
be the course pursued by this Government were a similar demand 
to be made upon it by that of l\Iexico. You will at as early a day 
as may be convenient bring these suggestions to the attention of 
the :Mexican minister of foreign affairs, and you will say at the 
same time that, upon a careful examination of the facts, this De-
partment reached the conclusion that the 1\Iexican Government 
was properly responsible for the damages resulting from the dis-
aster in question, and that the hope is entertained that the min-
ister will see the propriety and equity of an early adjustment of. 
the claim. 
I am, etc., FRED'K T. FRELINGHUYSEN. 
(U. S. Foreign Relations, 1884, p. 343.) 
On February 21, 1885, the schooner Lanie Oobb, of 
Bangor, ~1aine, while in the harbor of La Guayra, was 
run down by the Ana Eulogia, a vessel under commission 
of the Venezuelan Government. Secretary Bayard, writ-
ing to the United States representative in Venezuela after 
it had been found difficult to obtain any redress for dam-
ages, said: 
At the time of the accident the Ana Eulogia was under com-
mission of the Venezuelan Go\ernment, and that Government by 
~5114-08--3 
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every ren~oning is re:-:vonsible for the damage to the Lanie Cobb 
on ae~ount of the careless and inexcusable acts of those on board 
the former vessel. \Vhile, as previously stated, President Crespo's 
ownership ought not to have any effect in aggraxating damages, 
yet his high offire plar·es him in a position in which he must be 
personally coguiimnt of the injury done and peculiarly sensitive as 
to its redress. ( U. S. Foreign Rein tions, 1885, p. 925.) 
An act of Congress provided in the case of the steam-
ship Fo.~colia, which 'yas in collision 'vith the United 
States stean1er Oolurnbia.· 
Thn t the clailn of the owners of the British stea1nship Foscolia, 
sunk by <·ollision with the United States steamship Columbia on 
the en~ning of ~Iny twenty-eight, eighteen hundred nnd ninety-
eight, nea1· Fire Island light-ship, for and on account of the loss 
of said vessel and cargo, may be submitted to the United States 
d!strict court for the s~)uthern district of New York, under and in 
compliance with the rules of said court sitting as a court of ad-
mirnlty; and said court shall have jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine and to render judgment thereupon: Provided, however, '.rhat 
the investigation of said claim shall be made upon the following 
basis: First, the said court shall find the facts attending the loss 
of the said steamship .u~oscolia and her cargo; and, second, if it 
shnll appear that the responsibility therefor rests with the United 
States stean1ship Columbia, the court shall then ascertain and 
determine the amounts which should be paid to the owners, re-
spectively, of the Foscolia and her cargo, in order to reimburse 
them for the losses so sustained, and shall render a decree accord-
ingly: Provided f'ltrther, That the amounts of the losses sustained 
by the master, officers, and crew of the Foscolia may be included 
in such decree. 
That should such decree be rendered in favor of the owners of 
the Foscolia and her cargo, the amount thereof may be paid out 
of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated. 
(United States Statutes at Large, 57th Congress, 1901-1903, Vol. 
32, part 1, p. 242.) 
The case of the F oscolia is stated as follows: 
On the 28th of l\fay, 1898, about 7.45 o'clock, p. m., a collision 
occurred, in a fog, about 12 miles southerly and westerly from 
Fire Island light-ship, between the U. S. cruiser Coluntbia and the 
British steamship F'oscolia, a freighter owned by the libellants, 
which resulted in the total loss of the latter, with all of the cargo 
on board and the greater part of the stores and of the persona! 
effects of the crew. (123 Federal Reporter, 105.) 
Claims were made t<> recover $226,889.36. 
CASE OF THE ALEXANDER. 35 
'fhe United States adn1itted that the 0 olumbia did not 
sho\v lights and was sounding no fog signals on account 
of the existence of a state of war. 
The court decided that under the act of Congress the 
Foscolia \vas entitled to da1nages, eYen though the com-
mander of the 0 olu1nbia 1night be acting under orders. 
In this case the libellants took action to ascertain the 
a1nount of damages only by authority of an act of Con-
gress. 
C1ollision between United States naval a1txilia1·y collier 
and vessel in forei,qn harbor.-The Hongkong Daily Press 
of July 5, 1906, giYes a sun1n1ary of the case of the 
U. S. N. collier Alexanrle'r: 
That case was one of in pcrsonwn against Captain Gove, of 
the U. S. S. Alexander, clain1ing from him personal damages for 
the loss alleged to ha Ye been sustained by the collision all.eged 
to have occurred between the Alexander and the plaintiff's junk 
iu the waters of tbe harbor. The first consiueration for his lord-
ship was, the Ale..cander was a public artned yessel, the property 
of a frienuly nation, the United States of America. This ship at 
the time the collision was said to have occurred was in the 
waters of the colony on the implied invitation of tbe sovereign 
of the British Empire. r.rbat implied inYitation carried with it 
the undertaking that a public armeu yessel of tlle Uniteu States 
was free from the jurisdiction of that court so long as she de-
meaned herself in a friendly way within the jurisdiction. He 
took it that it would not be denied by his learned friend that as 
such an armed ship was free from all suits in the colony. It 
was necessary to establish that proposition because he wished to 
argue that the exemption afforded to the ship covered h'er as a 
unity, as an entity, covered her not merely as so much steel, but 
in her capacity as a public armed ship. One of the reasons for 
the immunity of a public armed ship, part of the military and 
naval force of a friendly nation, was so as not to interfere with 
her efficiency. As far as the hull went, it was free from arrest, 
and his learned friend, being well aware of that, did not go to 
the court for a warrant for the ship's arrest. The assumption 
was that the United States was willing to do justice to foreigners 
as well as to her own subjects, and the remedy for any person 
who suffered from collision with one of her ships was through the 
proper diploma tic channels. ~rhe immunity of ·a public armed 
ship was not confined to her hull only, it extended to her 
machinery, her guns (which were not a part of the ship), and to 
her captain and crew. Take the captain and the crew out of the 
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ship and she was reduced to the character of United States prop-
erty, but she was no longer an armed ship, part of the military 
and naval force, which that power had sent into Asiatic waters. 
Take the guns out of her and the same remark applies, though, 
the Alexander, being a collier, she would be less efficient without 
her crew than without her guns. Taking her crew out of her 
would render her inefficient to perform tbe services required of 
her. How could they contend that that which would render 
her still less efficient could be taken from her, could be made 
liable to this jurisdictiou? We have in this colony a law, 
which was repealed in England in 1861', which allows im-
prisonment for debt of the person of the debtor. A judgment 
against the captain renders hin1 liable to be imprisoned if he 
could not find the n1oney; the plaintiffs had the right to im-
prison the debtor. 
The CHIEF JusTICE. Your proposition is not confined to Hong-
kong? 
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL. Obviously not. 
Proceeding, he said that the general principle was that tbey 
must do nothing to interfere Ydth the efficiency of the ship or 
the purpose for which she was sent to those waters by a foreign 
sovereign. Captain Gove had come here from Shanghai out of 
respect for the jurisdiction of this court and the ship had gone 
to sea 'Yitbout a captain. That was a serious interference with 
the domestic economy of the ship, an interference with her effi-
ciency. I-Iis lordship had before him an affidavit -from the officer 
in co nun and of the station to the effect that he had received tele-
graphic orders that Captain Gove was to rejoin his ship as soon 
as he could get away. 'l'he captain of the Alexander could not 
bt:"' used as if he were the captain of an American merchant ship. 
The CHIEF JusTICE. Does the question of extraterritoriality 
come into it? Actions may be brought against foreign govern-
ments. 
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL. If they submit. 
~Jr. Slade argued that a foreign man-of-war was in the same 
position as a British man-of-war. Supposing a ship of war en-
gaged on important state duty ran down any \essel, if the officer 
in charge of her set foot on shore he might be sen·ed with a writ 
and become immediately subject to the jurisdiction of that court. 
It was suggested in that case that Captain Gove was acting in the 
course of his duty as captain of the Yessel that ran down the 
junk. Their allegation was that he was not acting properly in 
;command, that he was not doing his duty as a ser\ant of his 
state. They alleged that he had been guilty of neglect. If they 
admitted there was neglect the plaintiffs had no case. They 
said the captain was not doing his duty as he ought to ha\e 
done. Therefore the com1nands of his sovereign could not a vail 
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him. His orders were to proceed with all due and proper care 
fro1n the side of the U. S. S. Baltimore, then anchored at Kowloon 
Bay. He in fact disobeyed these orders, and by his negligence 
injures the plaintiffs. 
The attorney-general said there was no allegation of neglect in 
the writ. 
1\fr. Slade said the writ was in the usual form. Continuing, he 
said that when an action was brought against a British warship 
and judgment given, the dmnages were recovered from the cap-
tain personally, and he submitted that the captain of a foreign 
warship could not be in a better position than the captain of a 
British warship. 
Tlle attorney-general pointed out that the difference between 
the captain of a British warship and the captain of a foreign 
warRbip was that the former was always within the jurisdiction 
of the British courts. The King's writs ran in all the King's 
ships. 
' The Chief Justice reserved his judgment. 
The above-mentioned case vvas brought to the supreme 
court, Admiralty jurisdiction, _Hongkong, China, against 
Captain Gove, who commanded the U. S. naval auxiliary 
Alexander. The Alexander had coaled the U. S. S. Bal-
tirnore, and "when leaving the latter's side to proceed to 
her anchorage" collided ·with the junk, Tung On Tai. A 
naval board of inquiry placed the blame on the junk . 
. The owners of the junk brought suit under the civil law 
against the master of the Alexander. On request the 
governor of Hongkong directed the Crown la,vyers to 
conduct the case in behalf of the 'lT nited States. The 
judgment in this case involves several conclusions of suffi-
cient importance to "Tarrant reproduction in full, par-
ticularly as such decisions are not under ordinary circum-
stances easily accessible. 
The chief justice, Sir Francis Piggott, said: 
In this case the attorney-general moved on behalf of the 
Crown at the instance of the Governtnent of the United States to 
dismiss an action brought in the Admiralty jurisdiction of this 
court by the owners of the junk Tung On Tai and the owners of 
her cargo against Arthur E. Gove, the commander of th~ U. S. S. 
Alexander in respect of a collision which occurred in the waters 
of the harbour. 'l,he Alexander is an armed public -ressel, the 
pr-operty of the Government of the United States. The commander 
was in the service and pay of that Government and under the con-
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trol of the Secretary of the Kavy -of the United States. At the 
pm·iod of collision he was employed in active service conveying 
coal and other stores for the use of the public vessels of the 
"Cuited States Governn1ent on the East Asiatic Station and at the 
a etual time of collision he was in conunand of the ship engaged 
on such service. The ground of the attorney-general's protest is 
teat the court has no jurisdiction to entertain this action, this 
nwthod of proceeding being based upou the course pursued by the 
Admiralty adYocate in the case of the Constitution. The circum-
stances of this case are, howeYer, different, for whereas the suit 
conunenced in the case of the Constitution was in rem for salYage 
services, this suit is in personant, i. e., against the comtnander 
for dan1ages in respect of a collision caused by his alleged negli-
g.~nt navigation. It is not, so far as I know, settled that the 
principle that ships of war belonging to a nation with whom this 
C'ountry is at peace, are exempt from the civil jurisdiction of our 
courts, applies to the commanders of snch ships when, in hH 
alleged negligent performance of their duties, they cause damage 
which under other circumstances \vould render them liable to an 
action. 
The exterritoriality of foreign ships of war was considered at 
length in the case of the Parlentent Belge, and in the course of 
the judgment there are certain dicta which seem, though not in 
so many word~, to warrant the proposition for which the learned 
attorney-general contended, namely, this exterritoriality of the 
warships extenlled in smne measure to her officers and crew. If 
these dicta do bear this extension the commander of the Alex-
ander could not be sued for acts committed by him in the course 
of the performance of his duty. These dicta are as follows: 
"Has the Admiralty division juriHliction in respect of a collision 
to proceed in rem aga in~t a ship w11ich is at the tin1e of the pro-
ceedings the property of a foreign sovereign, is in the possession, 
control, and employ of the soYereign by means of his commis· 
sioned officers and is a public vessel of his state?" Again : "The 
first question rPally raises this, ·whether any part of the public 
property of any sovereign authority in use for national purposes 
is not as much exempt from the jurisdiction of any court as is 
the person of eYery sovereign." .. And ngain : "A public armed 
ship constitutPs a part of the auxiliaQ~ force of a nation, acts 
under the immediate and direct command of the sovereign, is 
emplo3~efl by hiln in national objects. He has n1any and po\verful 
inotiYes for preventing those objects from being defeated by the 
interference of a foreign state. Ruch interference cannot take 
place without affecting his power and dignity." And finally: 
" The point and force of this argument in t)le Prinz Ji'rederilc is 
that the public property of eYery sovereign state, being destined 
to public use, cannot \Yith reason be submitted to the jurisdiction 
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of courts of such states, because such jurisdiction, if exercised, 
nmst divert the public property from its destined public use, and 
that by international comity, which provides for the equality of 
f-::tates, lf such immunity, grounded ~n such reasons, exists in each 
state with regard to its own public property, the same immunity 
must be granted by each state to similar property of all other 
states." 
We may include with very little stretch of language in the 
term ''property of the state" the services of its paid officers, 
and the different propositions given in this judgment, together 
with the reasons, seem, as I have said, to cover the question of 
a collision by the alleged negligence of the commander of a state 
vessel and show that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain 
a personal action for damages. I use the word" cover" advisedly, 
for it may be that if they were applied without limitation to the 
personnel of this foreign vessel they would be far too wide. 
Before, therefore, I can hold this to be the law, there is a 
question to be considered which indeed lies on the surface-
why, if the principle does apply to the officers and crew of a 
public ship, does it not apply to all cases, for the attorney-
general's contention was limited to actions resulting from the per-
formance of duties; whereas the principles abo\e stated, if they 
apply to the officers and c~·ew, are wide enough to cover all 
cases, for in all cases the result of bringing this action will be to 
'vithdra w the defendant from the efficient performance of his 
official dutie~ and so interfere with the fighting efficiency of his 
ship. Secondly, there is the very ingenious point raised by the 
plaintiff's counsel, based on the whole, and especially on the con-
cluding, words of the last quotation given fron1 the judgment in 
the Parle1nent Belge. "By international comity, if such im-
munity, grounded on such reasons, exist in each state with regard 
to its own public property, the same immunity must be granted 
by each state to similar property of all other states." Thus, 
co.ncludes the learned counsel, seeing that the immunity claimed 
for the con1mander of the Alr>xandcr does not exist in England 
with regard to commanders of our own puhlic ships, it can not be 
l't:!Cognized as applicable to the commanders of foreign public 
ships. It is admitted that the commander of a British ship may 
be sued in an action such as the present, the principle enunciated 
by Lushington in the A~hol case and acted on in subsequent cases 
being that in case of tort or damage committed by vessels of the 
Crown the vessels can not be touched, but the le~al responsibility 
attaches to the actual wrongdoer only. 
The proposition advanced. though, as I say. very ingenious, 
inYolves a non-sequitur~· for admitting that the same immunity 
n1ust be granted as is granted to sin1ilar property owned by any 
state, non constat it may not grant a larger immunity to such 
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property when belonging to a foreign state. I think, with very 
great re~pect, the principle deduced by L. J. Brett from the de-
cision of the Prinz Frederik needs some amplification and ex-
planation. WhateYer the rule applicable to such a case as the 
present may be, there can be no question that it depends upon 
the comity which nations observe in their relations with one 
another. But comity depends upon mutual concessions between 
such states, and though it may be perfectly true that some of the 
rules which depend upon comity deal with subjects which are 
dealt with by the municipal laws of states under analogous cir-
cumstances and dealt with moreover by such laws in an identical 
or similar fashion, it by no means follows that the n1ethods and 
principles adopted by the municipal law form the criterion of 
the methods and principles which ought to be adopterl when a 
case, which de11ends on a comity, comes for decision. l\Iany cases 
dealt with by con1ity n1uch resemble cases dealt with b~y munici-
pal law, but beyond this it is not safe to go. There is an im-
nlunity which hedges the sovereignty-by English municipal law 
this takes the form of maxin1s. "The king can do no wrong." 
Statutes do not bind the Crown without express reference, but 
there is no surh maxim as " Kings can do no wrong." Foreign 
sovereigns are exem11t fron1 the jurisdiction of our courts, be-
en use the exercise of such jurisdiction is inconsistent with the 
independence of their sovereignty, the fundamental principle of 
comity being the equality of independent states. Or, to take the 
conYerse case, there is no ~uch rule at all in the French codes. 
Is it to be doubted that the King of England is exempt in France 
from the jurisdiction of the French courts? This illustration is 
sufficient to explain what I have just said. Other illustrations 
could, I belieYe, be found, but it is sufficient to say that so far as 
the rules of comity have become concrete they are based entirely 
on the mutual recognition of an equal independence, each refrain-
ing from acting so as to interfere with that sovereign's inde-
pendence, and so far as they have not yet become concrete the 
mutual recognition, when a case arises for decision, is of the 
spirit of the law, rather than of its actual proyisions-jus for 
jus, not lex for lex. In this I see no possibility of reference in 
determining what action is to be taken in any given circumstances 
by any state when its own sovereign or its public service is 
concerned. 
I therefore think that the plaintiff's contention can not ue 
maintained, and that the principles enunciated in the Parlcment 
Belge, as applicable to foreign public ships certainly cover tile 
case of the officers and crew on board, because they are under 
the control and employ of a foreign sovereign in national objects 
and because the jurisdiction of this court, if exercised, must 
divert their public service from its distinct public use. I may 
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refer in this connection to the New Chili Gold Mining Company 
v. Blanco ( 4 Times Law Reports, 346), when the court refused 
to allow a writ to issue out of the jurisdiction in an action to 
be brought against the ambassador accredited to the French 
Government. The judge differed as to the ground of refusal, 
but it being a matter of discretion the then chief justice said 
that the court ought not to call upon a foreign ambassador in 
a foreign country to leave his post and come over to this country. 
It would interfere with the duties he had to discharge. This I 
believe to be a sound doctrine, but it is clear that so far the 
proposition is too widely stated for this case, for unless it t>e 
limited in some way, as the learned attorney-general suggests, 
in law it arrived at something which, as stated, is not far re-
moved from complete exterritoriality of foreign naval officers, 
putting it on a par in all respects with the exterritoriality of 
their vessel. 'l'here is complete exterritoriality of ambassadors, 
but that is a case in which the rule of comity (expressed in 
statutory form in England) has taken concrete form. But it is 
clear that the case of naval officers has not yet taken such form, 
for there is no authority that I know of laying down what their 
immunity is. It is, I think, equally clear that no state has ever 
claimed such a complete im1nunity except in case of acts com-
mitted on board ~hip, but on the contrary that when their ships 
are in foreign waters all states recognize the necessity for their 
officers, while on shore, conforn1ing to tbe municipal laws, and 
that they 1nake no elaim for their surrender in case of breach 
of such laws, even though the result should be to withdraw 
them from thelr military sen·ice. This same principle applies, 
of course, to civil actions. This certainly supports the sugges-
tion that the immunity is limited to acts done whHe in perform-
ance of their duty. 
In order to make the analysis as complete as I am able, let us 
assume that while steering a n1an-of-war's gig during a regatta, 
at which the officers and sailors on board were only taking part 
as spectators, the officer in charge so negligently nayigated as to 
run down a sampan, causing its owner dan1age, I do not believe 
in such a case any Governn1ent would act as in this case the 
United States Government bas felt it its duty to act and ask 
for the action to be disn1issed, and yet the san1e dicta of the 
court in the Parlernent Belge might have been pressed into this 
service. The common law furnishes instances of analogous cases, 
where masters ba ve been held not liable for the negligence of 
their servants, although the negligent act was committed while 
the servant was driving his master's carriage, because the servant 
had gone off the route of duty for a diversion of his own. This 
analogy seems to warrant this limitation to the naval officer's 
immunity, which was, in fact, suggested by the learned attorney-
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general, and that it exists only so long as he forms a part of the 
machine known as a Yessel of war and commits this act of negli-
gence with and by n1eans of such Yessel and when it is in whole 
or in part under his control. But whether such immunity can be 
claimed by the officer himself I Yery much doubt. For these 
reasons the motion of the attorney-general must be sustained and 
the action dismissed with costs. 
rrhis decision establishes the imlnunity before foreign 
courts of officers engaged in the naval service "Then acting 
in the line of duty. 
1"'he decision ~ecognizes as a public officer the 1naster 
of a collier engaged in the public service under the ap-
pointn1ent of the Secretary of the K a vy. 
''Thteher such a Inaster 'vould be a public officer in the 
sense of the United States statutes is not a matter for a 
foreign court to decide. His action so far as the for-
eign stat~ is concerned is the action of a public official of 
the United States. For this action the TJnited States is 
responsible. 
:X o suit can therefore be had against the master of the 
vessel. 
This late decision is in accord with the principles that 
have been deYeloping for n1any years and in accord 'vith 
earlier decisions so far as applicable. 
Status of United States auxiliary 1.:e8sels.-By the 
Regulations for the N aYal ~l.uxiliary Srrvice, approved 
to go into effect April 1, 1907, Chapter I-
1. The na Yal auxiliary service as hereby organized will in-
clude such transports, supply Yessels, colliers, and other ves8cls 
as may be assigned to it by the Department. 
2. These vessels shall be governed by the laws of the United 
States, by the NaYy Regulations as far a~ they may be applicable, 
and by these regulations. 
Thus the naval auxiliary service is directly recognized 
as an ann of the X avy Departinent, and if thus recog-
nized by the United States, foreign states cannot question 
the fact that such vessels are public vessPls. 
The GoYernment has also prescribed the course of ac-
tion for co1nmanders of vessels of the United States in 
case of collision. 
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Regulations in regard to collisions.-There should be 
immediate action in accord with the Regulations for the 
Navy, 1905, article 422: 
(1) In the e-rent of a collision between a ship of the Navy and 
a merchant Yessel, so serious, or under such circumstances as not 
to admit of immediate repair with the resources at hand, and 
therefore likely to involve damages, the captain shall order a 
board of three officers to ascertain all the attendant circum-
stances, injuries recei-red by the merchant -resse1, probable 
amount of damages, and which of the ships is responsible for the 
accident; and the master of the merchant Yessel concerned shall 
be notified of the time and place of the meeting of the board and 
informed that the officers and men of his 'Vessel will be given a 
hearing by the board, if such hearing is desired. The report 
shall be prepared in triplicate; one copy shall be forwarded with-
out delay to the com1nander in chief for the Secretary of the 
Navy, one retained by the captnin of the ship, and the remaining 
copy giYen to the master of the merchant vessel, provided that 
the officers and crew thereof who were witnesses to the collision 
shall ha-re testified before the board. 'Vhen repairs llave been 
effected on the spot, a certificate to that effect shall be taken 
fron1 the 1naster of the merchant yessel and forwarded, through 
that commander in chief, to the Secretary of the NaYy. 
(2) If in the presence of a senior officer, the facts shall be im-
mediately reported to him, and he shall order the board. 
(3) If the collision occurs in the waters of the United States 
and results in the loss of life or damage to person or property, 
the captain shall inforn1 the collector of the district in which it 
occurs, in accordance with the act of June 20, 1874 (United States 
Laws relating to the :KaYy and ::\Iarine Corps, 1898, page 136) .a 
a A law of June 20, 1874, requires that.-after July 1, 1874, "whenever 
any vessel of the United States bas sustained or caused any 
accident involving the loss of life, the material loss of property, or 
any seriom:; injury to any person, or bas received any material damage 
affecting her seaworthiness or her efficiency, the managing owner, agent, 
or master of sucll vessel shall within five days after the happening of 
such accident or damage, or as soon thC'rcafter as possible, send, by letter 
to the collector of customs of the district wherein such vessel belongs 
or of that within which such accident or damage occurred, a report 
thereof, signed by such owner, agent, or master, stating the name and 
official number (if any) of the vessel, the port to which she belongs, the 
place where she was, the nature and probable occasion of the casualty, 
the number and names of those lost, and the probable amount of the 
loss or damage to the vessel or cargo ; and shall furnish, upon the request 
of either of such collectors of customs, such other information concern-
ing the vessel, her cargo, and the casualty as may be called for; and 
if he neglect or refuse to comply with the foregoing requirement after 
a reasonable time, he shall incur a penalty of one hundred dollars." 
(18 Statutes at Large, chap. 344, §10.) 
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( 4) He shall, if the collision occurs in a foreign port, take such 
measures as may be required by the port regulations, informing 
the captain of the port, should it be necessary. 
( 5) The foregoing provisions of this article shall apply, as far 
as practicable, in all cases of collision by a ship of the Navy with 
a wharf, float, or other object. 
(G) \\"'henever, in consequence of injuries sustained in a for-
eign port by a United States vessel, as a result of a collision be-
tween it and a foreign merchant vessel, clearly the fault of the 
latter, it may become necessary or desirable, on the part of the 
contmanding officer of the vessel, to libel the latter vessel, such 
libel proceedings shall be instituted in the natue of the United 
States, and not in the name of such contmanding officer. In all 
such cases it shall be the duty of the commanding officer con-
cerned, or of the senior officer present, according to circumstances, 
immediately to inform the Department of his action. 
Resume.-The situation under consideration is as fol-
lows: 
A United States auxiliary collier contmantled by an officer 
appointed by the Secretary of the :Xavy is in a harbor of State 
X. The collier collides with and injures a foreign vessel. The 
owner of the foreign vessel brings suit against tlle contmander of 
the collier for damages under the civil law, claiming that the 
status of the collier is uncertain, and that the commander would 
in any case be liable as would the con1mander of a ship of the 
State X, the cotnmanders of whose vessels, public and private, 
are liable in the civil courts of that state, under similar circum-
stances. 
The fact that the commanding officer is appointed by 
the Secretary of the Navy rather than under the usual 
commission is not a 1natter of which any foreign state may 
properly take cognizance, provided his conduct is regu-
lated by government orders and provided the government 
is responsible for his action. In this case, so far as the 
foreign state is concerned, the auxiliary collier is a vessel 
of the United States Navy and is therefore a public ves-
sel. The precedents, opinions, and regulations show that 
public vessels are not subject to the jurisdiction of a for-
eign state in such a situation as is under consideration. 
The recent Regulations for the Naval Auxiliary Serv-
ice of the United States make such a vessel as an auxil-
iary collier a part of the naval force to be governed by 
the Navy Regulations as far as these may be applicable. 
CONCLUSION. 45 
These Regulations for 1905 provide, article 422, for the 
course of action in cases of collision. 
The aim as set forth in precedents, opinions, and regu-
lations is not to make it possible for the state which they 
represent to avoid responsibility for acts of public vessels 
while in a foreign harbor, but rather to avoid complica-
tions which might follow if a public vessel is detained 
during the period of suit before a court. 
In order not to interfere with the action of a public 
vessel and at the same time not to deprive the owner of 
the foreign vessel which had been in collision of any just 
compensation for damages, it has become common and 
in general seems to have worked satisfactorily to present 
claims through the regular diplomatic channels. Ac-
cordingly, the action of the responsible officer should be 
determined by the above considerations. 
0 onclusion.-The senior officer, acting in accordance 
with principle, precedent, and regulations, should ap-
point a board of inquiry and maintain that the suit 
should not be brought against the master of the auxil-
iary collier, but that the claims should be referred to the 
United States Government through d!plomatic channels. 
